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Excessive abundance of common resources deters social responsibility
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We study the evolution of cooperation in the collective-risk social dilemma game, where the risk is deter-
mined by a collective target that must be reached with individual contributions. All players initially receive
endowments from the available amount of common resources. While cooperators contribute part of their en-
dowment to the collective target, defectors do not. If the target is not reached, the endowments of all players are
lost. In our model, we introduce a feedback between the amount of common resources and the contributions of
cooperators. We show that cooperation can be sustained only if the common resources are preserved but never
excessively abound. This, however, requires a delicate balance between the amount of common resources that
initially exist, and the amount cooperators contribute to the collective target. Exceeding critical thresholds in
either of the two amounts leads to loss of cooperation, and consequently to the depletion of common resources.
Ensuring sustainable use of environmental, social, and tech-
nological resources is a global challenge [1]. Stripped of par-
ticularities, the problem is essentially that of responsive use
of public goods [2]. If the public goods are not managed re-
sponsibly, the “tragedy of the commons” [3] is unavoidable.
The public goods game is traditionally employed as a theo-
retical model that describes the social dilemma that emerges
when individual short-term interests are inherently different
from what would be best for the society as a whole [4]. Gov-
erned by group interactions, the public goods game requires
that players decide simultaneously whether they wish to con-
tribute to the common pool, i.e., to cooperate, or not. Regard-
less of the chosen strategy, each member of the group receives
an equal share of the public good after the initial investments
are multiplied by a synergy factor that takes into account the
added value of collaborative efforts. Evidently, individuals
are best off by not contributing anything to the common pool,
i.e., by defecting, while the group would be most successful if
everybody cooperated.
Although many mechanisms are known that promote the
evolution of cooperation in the public goods game [5–7], such
as punishment [8–14], reward [15–17], and social diversity
[18, 19], it has recently been argued that the collective-risk
social dilemma game might be more appropriate for captur-
ing the essence of several realistic problems concerning the
conservation of common resources [20]. In particular, the
collective-risk social dilemma game describes how the fail-
ure to reach a declared collective target can have severe long-
term consequences. Opting out of carbon emission reduction
to harvest short-term economic beneﬁts is a typical example
[21]. The description of the game is as follows. All players
within a group are considered to have an initial endowment
that comes from the common pool of available resources.
While cooperators contribute a fraction of their endowment
to the collective target, defectors retain everything for them-
selves. The risk level is determined by a collective target that
should be reached with the contributions of cooperators. If
a group fails to reach this target, all members of the group
∗Electronic address: chenx@iiasa.ac.at
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lose their remaining endowments, while otherwise the endow-
ments are retained. The collective-risk social dilemma game
thus accounts directly for the depletion of common resources
that may result from opting out of cooperation. Recent exper-
imental and theoretical studies have shown that high risk of
collective failure raises the chances for coordinated socially
responsible actions [22–27].
However, existing modelling studies have assumed that the
contributions of cooperators are independent of the available
amount of common resources. Here we depart from this tra-
ditional setup by introducing a feedback between the amount
of common resources and the amount cooperators contribute
to the collective target. Our assumption is that in a harsh
environment, when common resources are scarce, coopera-
tors are likely to contribute less. On the other hand, if com-
mon resources abound, it seems more reasonable to expect
larger contributions towards the collective target. Previous
theoretical research has already considered various feedbacks
between cooperation and the environment [28–30], while a
thoroughly documented experimental example is the resource
competition in populations of yeast [31–33]. Yeast prefers
to use the monosaccharides glucose and fructose as carbon
sources. When these sugars are not available, yeast can me-
tabolize alternative carbon sources such as the disaccharide
sucrose by producing and secreting the enzyme invertase. The
production and secretion of invertase is costly, yet it creates a
common resource that can be consumed by the whole pop-
ulation. It has been reported that increasing the amount of
glucose available in the media promotes the growth of defec-
tors (yeast that do not production and secretion invertase), thus
decreasing the fraction of cooperators at equilibrium and even
driving the cooperators to extinction. On the other hand, as
the cooperators decreases in frequency, the amount of glucose
which sucrose is hydrolyzed to also decreases [32]. Therefore,
there exists a feedback between the density of cooperators and
the amount of monosaccharides in the media [33].
We would like to emphasize that our model is not meant to
describe a particular experiment, like the resource competition
in populations of yeast that we have just described. Instead,
we wish to draw on this example and use it as motivation to
propose a minimalist model for a proof of principle — namely
that the excessive abundance of common resources may hin-
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2FIG. 1: Socially responsible actions are viable even if the common
resources are initially scarce, as long as the common pool is subse-
quently kept properly ﬁlled. Either too low or too abundant contri-
butions, or failure to distribute them in time, can lead to the tragedy
of the commons. Colour maps encode the fraction of cooperators ρc
in dependence on the multiplication factor α and the initial amount
of common resources available to each group R, for three different
values of the maximal endowment b: (a) 5, (b) 10, and (c) 20.
der the evolution of cooperation in the collective-risk social
dilemma game. Previous models of public goods have ignored
resource dynamics in the common pool, and they have also
ignored the fact that cooperative behaviours can be inﬂuenced
by the degree of resources in the common pool. In the pro-
posed model, we therefore assume that there exists a common
resource, a non-empty pool, which provides an initial endow-
ment to every player. Subsequently, every individual must de-
cide whether a certain amount of this endowment will be used
to reﬁll the pool or not. Reﬁlling the pool is a socially respon-
sible act of cooperation. Importantly, in subsequent rounds,
the endowment issued to every player is proportional to the
updated amount of the common resource. If the pool is emp-
tying, the endowments will be less and less, and vice versa if
the common resource is managed proﬁtably. However, if the
resources in the pool become abundant, we impose an upper
bound on the endowment, corresponding to the fact that each
individual only needs as much resources from the common
pool to be completely satisﬁed [33, 34]. The question that
we aim to answer is how does the described feedback affect
the evolution of cooperation [35]. We perform simulations of
the collective-risk social dilemma game on structured popu-
lations. In the next section, we present results that we have
obtained on the square lattice, while results for several other
interaction networks are summarized in the Supplementary In-
formation that accompanies this paper.
Results
We begin by presenting colour maps encoding the station-
ary fraction of cooperators ρc in dependence on both the mul-
tiplication factor α and the initial amount of common re-
sources R for three different values of the maximal possible
endowment b. Several interesting conclusions can be drawn
from the results presented in Fig. 1. First, it can be observed
at a glance that increasing b (from left to right) increases ρc
over wide regions of α and R. This suggests that if com-
mon resources in the population abound, they should be dis-
tributed rather than held back. Although this seems to go
against cautionary usage and conservation, holding back has,
in the long run, several unintended consequences. If the com-
mon resources are not distributed right away, defectors can
exploit the accumulated stock long after cooperators have dis-
appeared from the neighbourhood. This creates an evolution-
ary niche for free-riders by means of which they can rise to
complete dominance.
The impact of α and R is not as straightforward. As can
be inferred from Fig. 1, only intermediate values of α ensure
ρc > 0. However, the span of the optimal interval depends
on the maximal endowment b. The larger the maximal en-
dowment b, the broader the interval of suitable values of α.
Moreover, there exists an upper bound on R, beyond which
cooperators cannot survive. The maximalR increases slightly
with increasing b, but the effect is rather small. Conversely,
even if initially the common resources are very scarce, coop-
erators are not negatively affected provided α and b are from
within the limits that ensure ρc > 0. This suggests that coop-
erative behaviour may develop even under adverse conditions,
and it is in fact more likely to do so than under abundance. The
extinction of cooperators at both too large R and too large α
indicates that an excessive abundance of common resources
acts detrimental on the evolution of cooperation, and that thus
it deters social responsibility.
To further support our conclusions, we show in Fig. 2(a) the
fraction of groups where the cumulative common goods can
be sustained at equilibrium [i.e.,Ri(∞) > 0], and in Fig. 2(b)
the fraction of groups where the cumulative common goods
can provide enough endowments [i.e., Ri(∞) ≥ Gb] for all
involved. It can be observed that, in comparison to Fig. 1, the
fraction of sustainable groups is larger than zero in a broader
region of parameter values. It is much higher than the cor-
responding fraction of cooperators for large α. In combina-
tion with Fig. 1, we thus ﬁnd that there exists an intermediate
region of α that enables cooperators to dominate the popula-
tion, as well as maintains a sufﬁcient level of common goods
in each group for individuals to be fully satisﬁed. Although
the region for such a complete win-win outcome is not broad,
it can be broadened by increasing the value of b.
FIG. 2: Sustainability of common resources is achieved by socially
responsible actions. Only an intermediate contribution strength,
combined with initially scarce resources, leads to sustainable com-
mon resources. In panel (a) the colour map encodes the fraction
of groups where the resources can be sustained [i.e., Ri(∞) > 0],
while in panel (b) the colour map encodes the fraction of groups
where the cumulative common goods can provide enough endow-
ments [i.e.,Ri(∞) ≥ Gb] for all involved. For results in both panels
we use the maximal endowment b = 10.
3FIG. 3: Spatial patterns explain why an excessive abundance of com-
mon resources deters social responsibility. Blue (yellow) are coop-
erators (defectors) that are central to groups where the common re-
sources abound, while green (red) are cooperators (defectors) that
are central to groups where the common resources are scarce. Grey
denotes defectors where the common resources are completely de-
pleted. Top row show the time evolution (from left to right) for
α = 1, b = 10, andR = 50. Due to the low multiplication factor the
common resources vanish fast. Middle row shows the time evolution
for α = 10, b = 10, and R = 50. Here only cooperative groups
succeed in keeping the pool from emptying. Groups with defectors
quickly become unsustainable and hence pave the way towards coop-
erator dominance. Bottom row show the time evolution for α = 20,
b = 10, and R = 50. Due to the high value of α common re-
sources start to abound excessively, making even predominantly de-
fective groups sustainable and thus ﬁt to invade cooperators.
The series of snapshots presented in Fig. 3 offers an insight
as to what causes the described evolutionary outcomes. We
use different colours not just for cooperators and defectors, but
also depending on the available amount of common resources.
More precisely, blue (yellow) colour denotes cooperators (de-
fectors) that are central to groups where Ri(t) ≥ Gb. On the
other hand, green (red) colour denotes cooperators (defectors)
where Ri(t) < Gb. Grey are defectors where there are no
more common resources left (note that Ri(t) is always larger
than zero if cooperators are present). For clarity, we always
begin with Ri(0) = Gb. Accordingly, blue cooperators and
yellow defectors are initially distributed uniformly at random
(leftmost panels of Fig. 3).
For low α (top row of Fig. 3), the common resources are
depleted fast. Defectors turn to red and cooperators turn to
green, and widespread grey patches occur only after a few
iterations of the game. Soon all is left are isolated islands
of defectors who exploit the few remaining cooperators, until
eventually all common resources vanish. Consequently, grey
defectors come to dominate the entire population. This sce-
nario is characteristic for the case when short-term beneﬁts
and ineffective cooperative efforts prevent sustainable man-
agement of common resources.
For intermediate α (middle row of Fig. 3), the scenario is
very different. Grouped cooperators are able to preserve and
enrich their resources, while groups with defectors fail to do
so. Blue cooperative domains, where the common resources
abound, become separated from red defectors by strips of
green cooperators, which essentially protect the blue domains
from being exploited further. The interfaces where green co-
operators and red defectors meet become the shield that pro-
tects blue cooperative domains. In fact, blue cooperators are
able to spread by means of an indirect territorial battle. It is
important to note that yellow defectors are practically non-
existent, i.e., a defector cannot sustain a proﬁtable group, and
accordingly areas of grey soon emerge. These defectors be-
come easy targets once being exposed to blue cooperators.
For high α (bottom row of Fig. 3), the situation changes
again. Here the effectiveness of cooperators is so high that
even a few in each group are able to provide more than
enough resources for defectors. Accordingly, yellow defec-
tors emerge, which can prevail even against blue domains of
cooperators. Note that defectors still have an evolutionary ad-
vantage stemming from their refusal to sacriﬁce a fraction of
personal beneﬁts for the conservation of common resources.
The stationary state is thus a diverse mix of all possible states,
where defectors are more widespread since they don’t con-
tribute to the common pool. Nevertheless, if α is not too large
some cooperators can still prevail by forming clusters, which
as for intermediate values of α are shielded by green coop-
erators. The “shield”, however, is not very effective and ac-
cordingly has many holes, manifesting rather as isolated green
cooperators which signal loss of the blue status rather than
forming a compact chain that would prevent the invasion of
defectors. If α is larger still (not shown), the utter abundance
of common resources leads to the complete dominance of de-
fectors, and ultimately to the tragedy of the commons as for
low values of α. The evolutionary path is signiﬁcantly differ-
ent though, given that for large α the tragedy is preceded by
widespread yellow (rich) rather than red (poor) defectors. It
is also worth noting that large initial values of R result in an
identical demise of cooperation as large values of α.
To verify the robustness of the presented results, we con-
clude this section by considering several variations of the pro-
posed collective-risk social dilemma game. In particular, we
have studied the effects of (i) the population size, (ii) the
topology of the population structure, (iii) different uncertain-
ties by strategy adoptions, (iv) the delay in individual strat-
egy updating, (v) the birth-death update rule [36], as well as
(vi) the effects of cooperator’s priority towards limited endow-
ments [32]. Since the obtained results are not central to the
main message of this study, we present all the details and the
obtained results in the Supplementary Information. Most im-
portantly, we ﬁnd that on structured populations our conclu-
sions remain intact under all considered circumstances, thus
indicating a high degree of universality. Nevertheless, we em-
phasize that our conclusions could be challenged under well-
mixed conditions. Well-mixing will break up the clusters that
we have described in the preceding paragraphs, and this may
change the results in favour of non-cooperation. This may
be particularly relevant for human cooperation [6, 37], where
the movements of and between groups could introduce well-
mixed conditions.
4Discussion
We have shown that an excessive abundance of common re-
sources deters socially responsible actions on structured popu-
lations. If either the common resources are initially too many,
if the cooperators are too effective in reﬁlling the pool, or if
the maximally allowed endowments are too low for allowing
an immediate dissemination of accumulated goods, the defec-
tors are able to take full advantage of their refrain from con-
tributing without suffering the consequences. If sufﬁciently
abundant, the excess allows defectors to free-ride well over the
time horizon that is required for cooperators to die out. Once
this happens the tragedy of the commons cannot be averted.
Less surprisingly, if initially the commons resources are ab-
sent, or if the efforts of cooperators are ineffective to a degree
that the pool becomes empty, the tragedy sets in as well.
The key to sustainability is to properly adjust maximal en-
dowments, which must go hand in hand with the availability
of common resources. An abundance of common resources
must be felt by all individuals belonging to the group, and
the rewards must be administrated fast. This reinforces so-
cial responsibility and reimburses cooperators for their pre-
ceding selﬂess efforts. Failure to do so sooner or later means
that the common resources are there for the taking without the
need to cooperate. A downward spiral emerges, because the
depletion of common resources averts from cooperation also
those that previously might have felt it was a viable strategy
to adopt. All that is eventually left is a depleted common re-
source and widespread defection, despite the brief period of
excessive abundance.
Based on our ﬁndings, as well as based on existing the-
oretical and experimental research [31, 32, 38–41], we may
conclude that cooperation is the more likely outcome if ini-
tially the common resources are scarce rather than abundant.
In particular, this conclusion is in agreement with data from
experiments conducted on yeast [31, 32] as well as on social
vertebrates [42]. In particular, when the amount of glucose
available in the media is increased, defective yeast that do not
pay a cost for producing invertase can spread faster than co-
operative yeast, even driving cooperative yeast to extinction
[31, 32]. Similarly, experiments on social vertebrates indicate
that unfavourable environmental conditions, where resources
are limited, reduce social conﬂict and make social vertebrates
more cooperative [42]. We hope that the demonstrated impor-
tance of the feedback between cooperative behavior and the
availability of common resources will inspire further research
aimed at understanding the evolution of cooperation, not least
in human societies [6], where the consideration of mobility
might lead to particularly interesting results.
Methods
The game is staged on a L× L square lattice with periodic
boundary conditions. As demonstrated in the Supplementary
Information, changing the topology of the interaction network
does not affect the main conclusions of this study. Each player
on site xwith von Neumann neighborhood is a member of ﬁve
overlapping groups of sizeG = 5, and it is initially designated
either as a cooperator (sx = 1) or defector (sx = 0) with
equal probability. At time t, the endowment aix from group i
is deﬁned as
aix =
{
b if Ri(t) ≥ Gb,
Ri(t)/G if Ri(t) < Gb,
(1)
where Ri(t) is the amount of common resources (public
goods) available to the group at the time, and b determines the
maximal possible endowment an individual is able to receive.
As noted before, this is to take into account that there is only
so much an individual needs [33, 34], regardless of how abun-
dant the common resource may become. Cooperators con-
tribute a ﬁxed amount c to the common pool in order to pre-
vent its depletion. Defectors contribute nothing. Accordingly,
the payoff of player x from group i is thus P ix = a
i
x − sxc,
while the total payoff Px is simply the sum over all P
i
x re-
ceived from groups where x is a member.
We note that the introduction of a ceiling (b) to the endow-
ment is the simplest way by means of which we take into ac-
count that, beyond a certain amount, higher endowments will
yield no additional returns. Future modelling studies could
address more realistic scenarios, for example such where ﬁt-
ness gains continue to increase with increasing endowment
but there are diminishing returns. While we do not expect
qualitatively different results, the gradual decline of returns
with higher endowments might delay the onset of cooperation
and affect the parameter values at which we observe the high-
est levels of cooperative behavior.
Starting with Ri(0) = R in all groups, the amount of com-
mon resources in each group i is updated according to
Ri(t+ 1) = Ri(t) +
∑
x∈i
(αsxc− a
i
x), (2)
where α is the multiplication factor to the amount cooperators
contribute to reﬁlling the pool, thus taking into account syn-
ergetic effects of group efforts. For simplicity, we set c = 1,
while b, R and α are the three key parameters determining the
evolutionary dynamics of the game.
After each round of the game, player x is given the oppor-
tunity to imitate the strategy of one randomly selected nearest
neighbour y. The strategy transfer occurs with the probability
q =
1
1 + exp[(Px − Py)/K]
, (3)
where K is the uncertainty by strategy adoptions [43]. With-
out losing generality [44], we use K = 0.5, so that it is very
likely that better performing players will be imitated, although
those performing worse may occasionally be imitated as well.
As the key quantity, we measure the stationary fraction
of cooperators ρc = L
−2
∑
x sx(∞), where sx(∞) denotes
the strategy of player x when the system reaches dynamical
equilibrium, i.e., when the average cooperation level becomes
time-independent. Moreover, we average the ﬁnal outcome
over 100 independent initial conditions.
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6SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
To verify the robustness of the main results presented in
the paper, this supplementary information is devoted to the
study of several variations of the proposed collective-risk so-
cial dilemma. In particular, we study the effects of the popu-
lation size (§I), the topology of the population structure (§II),
different uncertainties by strategy adoptions (§III), the delay
in individual strategy updating (§IV), the birth-death update
rule (§V), as well as the effects of cooperator’s priority to-
wards limited endowments (§VI). In general, our results re-
main valid under all considered circumstances.
I. Population size
FIG. 1: Time evolution of the fraction of cooperators for different
population sizes (see legend). Parameter values are: b = 10,R = 10
and α = 10.
In this section, we present the time evolution of the fraction
of cooperators for different population sizes, to see how the
outcome of the evolutionary process depends on this quantity.
Figure 1 shows that increasing the population size does in-
crease the time for the system to reach the stationary state, but
it does not affect the composition of the strategies. For larger
population sizes, the system simply needs longer to reach the
stationary state.
II. Population structure
In this section, we consider the studied collective-risk so-
cial dilemma on a random network, on the regular ring, and
on the square lattice with Moore neighborhood. On a random
network, each individual forms a group with otherG−1 indi-
viduals randomly chosen from the whole population, and gets
its payoff only from the interactions within the group. While
in other interaction networks, each individual participates in
all the G groups that are centered not only on itself, but also
on its nearest neighbors. Figure 2 shows the stationary frac-
tion of cooperators in dependence on α and R. It can be ob-
served that there exist intermediate α values maximizing the
fraction of cooperators, and there exists an upper bound value
of R beyond which cooperators die out. This indicates that
FIG. 2: The stationary fraction of cooperators in dependence on the
multiplication factor and the initial amount of common resources, as
obtained for different population structures: (a) random network with
group size G = 5, (b) regular ring with group size G = 5, and (c)
square lattice with Moore neighborhood (G = 9). Parameter values
are: b = 10, K = 0.5, and the population size is 104 in all three
cases.
our ﬁndings are robust against the changes in the structure of
the interaction networks.
III. Uncertainty by strategy adoptions
In this section, we demonstrate the effects of different un-
certainty by strategy adoptions on the evolution of coopera-
tion in the studied collective-risk social dilemma. From re-
sults presented in Fig. 3 it follows that the stationary fraction
of cooperators varying withK displays four different types of
behavior, depending on the value of the multiplication factor
α. First, for a relatively small value of α, the fraction of co-
operators ﬁrst increases slowly until reaching the maximum
value, and then decreases dramatically to zero with increasing
K. Second, for a slightly larger α value, full cooperation can
be achieved when K varies from 0.01 to 5. But the fraction
of cooperators dramatically decreases to zero with further in-
creasingK from 5. Third, for an appropriately intermediate α
value, full cooperation can always be achieved whenK varies
in a large range [0.01, 100]. Fourth, for a much larger α value,
the fraction of cooperators declines slightly with increasing
K. This qualitatively different behavior has been revealed in
FIG. 3: The stationary fraction of cooperators in dependence on the
uncertainty parameter K for different values of the multiplication
factor α, as obtained on a square lattice with von Neumann neigh-
borhood. Parameter values are: b = 10 and L2 = 104.
7previous works, and here we demonstrate again that the un-
certainly by strategy adoptions plays an important role by the
evolution of cooperation [1, 2].
IV. Delay in individual strategy updating
FIG. 4: The stationary fraction of cooperators in dependence on the
delay parameter for individual strategy update for different values
of the multiplication factor α on a square lattice with von Neumann
neighborhood. Here, b = 10 and the size of the square lattice is
L2 = 104. The initial amount of common resources R is 10 in (a)
and 500 in (b).
In this section, we consider that each individual is subject
to delay during strategy updating. While as before, an individ-
ual has the opportunity to imitate the strategy of one randomly
chosen neighbor y, the probability for this step to be attempted
is d < 1 (rather than d = 1, as in the main paper). On the
other hand, the amount of common resource in each group is
still updated at each time step. Figure 4 shows the stationary
fraction of cooperators as a function of d for different inter-
mediate values of α. For small initial R = 10 in panel (a), the
fraction of cooperators varying with d displays three different
types of behavior, depending on the value of the multiplication
factor α. First, for a relatively small α value, full cooperation
is achieved for the delay factor d < 0.70. But with increas-
ing d from 0.70, the fraction of cooperators decreases quickly.
Second, for slightly larger α values, full cooperation can al-
ways be achieved, irrespective of the value of d. Third, for
much larger α values, the fraction of cooperators gradually
decreases with increasing d. In addition, for much small or
much large values of α, full defection is always achieved, ir-
respective of the value of d (not shown here). For large initial
R = 500 in panel (b), we see that the fraction of cooperators
ﬁrst decreases slowly with increasing d, and then dramatically
decreases to zero after d reaches a critical value, and that this
is the case for several different intermediate values of α.
V. Birth-death update rule
With the motivation to consider the studied collective-risk
social dilemma in a perhaps biologically more relevant con-
text, we consider the birth-death rule instead of the imitation
rule used in the main text. Under the birth-death rule, an
FIG. 5: The stationary fraction of cooperators in dependence on the
multiplication factor α and the initial amount of common resources
R, as obtained with the birth-death update rule on a square lattice.
Here, b = 10, w = 0.5, and the linear population size is L = 20.
individual is chosen for reproduction proportional to ﬁtness
at each time step, and then the offspring replaces a random
neighbour. Because the ﬁtness has to be positive, following
previous works [3, 4], we deﬁne an individual x’s ﬁtness as
fx = exp(wPx), where w (w > 0) is the selection inten-
sity. Figure 5 depicts that there exist intermediate α values
maximizing the fraction of cooperators, and there exists an
upper bound value of R beyond which cooperators go ex-
tinct. This indicates that our ﬁndings are robust against the
changes of update rule. Moreover, the upper bound value of
R is much higher than the one determined under the imitation
rule. In fact, under birth-death update rule at each time step
the amount of common resource in each group is updated, but
only one individual is chosen for updating the strategy. Thus,
the amount of common resources is updated faster than indi-
vidual strategies, and the upper bound thus becomes larger.
VI. Cooperator’s priority towards limited endowments
Inspired by Ref. [5], in this section we consider that coop-
erators can have the priority to use the common resource they
produced, especially when the common resource is limited.
To be speciﬁc, when the common resource is not abundant,
cooperators can preferentially to obtain an endowment at a
certain probability p. Then, a cooperator’s endowment from
FIG. 6: The stationary fraction of cooperators in dependence on the
multiplication factor α for different probability values of coopera-
tor’s priority p. Other parameter values are: b = 10, K = 0.5,
R = 10, and the size of the square lattice is L2 = 104.
8group i is given as
aic =
{
b if ncb ≤ Ri(t) < Gb,
Ri(t)/nc if 0 < Ri(t) < ncb,
(4)
and a defector’s endowment from the same group is given as
aid =
{
Ri(t)−ncb
G−nc
if ncb ≤ Ri(t) < Gb,
0 if 0 < Ri(t) < ncb,
(5)
where nc is the number of cooperators in group i. With prob-
ability 1 − p, an individual’s endowment is assigned accord-
ing to the method in the main text. In Fig. 6, we show that
there still exists an intermediate value of the multiplication
factor inducing the maximal fraction of cooperators for differ-
ent value of p, when the initial amount of common resource is
limited. In addition, increasing the p value can further favor
the evolution of cooperation. This is because, if cooperator’s
priority towards limited common resource is ampliﬁed, coop-
erators simply obtain more opportunities to collect a higher
payoff than defectors.
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